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On Not Saying, Not Knowing and Thinking About Nothing: Adorno, Dionysius, Derrida 
and the Negation of Art 
 
Abstract 
This article examines accounts of negation or the apophatic in Pseudo-Dionysius, Theodor 
Adorno and Jacques Derrida alongside a contemporary work of art by London Fieldworks, 
Null Object: Gustav Metzger Thinks About Nothing (2011). By exploring models of negative 
knowledge offered in these works, it asks what happens to the work of art when it becomes 
preoccupied with negation and how a work of art might embody or manifest – without 
reproducing – philosophical discourses about negation.  
 
 
 I take as my starting point for this paper three failures of language – three rhetorical 
instances of not saying, or not being able to speak. The first is a quotation from Theodor 
Adorno’s posthumously published Aesthetic Theory: ‘Art requires philosophy, which 
interprets it in order to say what it is unable to say, whereas art is only able to say it by not 
saying it.’1 The second might be summarised by Wittgenstein’s aphorism, ‘whereof one 
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent,’2 but goes much further back, to the origins of the 
Christian tradition of negative theology in the writings of Pseudo-Denys, also known as 
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, a 6th-century Syrian mystic. The third is contained within 
the title of Jacques Derrida’s essay (originally a speech), on the possibility or impossibility of 
not saying: ‘Comment ne pas parler: dénégations.’3 
 What follows is an attempt to trace a shared structure in each of these confrontations 
with the limits of language, or the relation of speaking to its other – a relation conceived in 
each case via a logic of negation. To those three ‘not sayings’ I add an instance of not 
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thinking, or rather of thinking about nothing, through the work of contemporary visual artists 
Bruce Gilchrist and Jo Joelson, operating as London Fieldworks. Their 2011 piece Null 
Object: Gustav Metzger thinks about nothing is an intriguing visual figuration of a similar 
logic of negation. It invites us to consider how that logic might be understood via a non-
linguistic exploration of it, and what is at stake in the idea of both negative knowledge and 
the negative image.  
 What I propose is not a genealogy of negative knowledge, still less an application of 
one or other theory of negation to a particular (and potentially arbitrary) aesthetic object. My 
contention is rather that this cluster, or constellation, of interrelated explorations of negation 
offers a productive way of thinking about negation itself, notably as it appears in works of art. 
In response to the claim advanced by Adorno, that in late modernity art becomes preoccupied 
with its own negativity, I ask what happens when a work of art sets out to concern itself with 
a kind of structural negation. Can it offer a counterpart to theories of negative knowledge 
without being able to speak (theoretically or otherwise)? Can asking such questions of this 
body of material help us think about the relationship between theory and the recalcitrant 
aesthetic objects it is so often forced negatively to circumscribe or circumlocute? 
 I begin with Adorno, then, who is concerned with precisely this relationship between 
theory (or philosophy, or conceptual knowledge) and the work of art: ‘Art requires 
philosophy, which interprets it in order to say what it is unable to say, whereas art is only able 
to say it by not saying it.’ In this typically paradoxical utterance, Adorno sums up the 
negative, or chiastic structure of his aesthetics. The work of art, whether literary, visual or 
musical has what Gerhard Richter has called ‘non-propositional truth content’4. This can be 
elucidated by philosophy, but can never be articulated directly as a proposition by the work 
itself. Philosophy translates or circumlocutes this non-propositional truth content, but cannot 
express it as the work of art does. The work of art’s capacity to embody a truth at all stems 
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from its resistance to the logic of propositions, to what Adorno calls ‘identity thinking’ – to 
the idea that existing concepts are adequate to account for things as they really are. Art can 
thus never be reduced to descriptions or theorisations of it, because such accounts rely on 
rational language and concepts. In refusing this logic, in not working through concepts at all, 
the work of art resists rationality’s totalizing tendencies. It comes to stand for the possibility 
of something that is beyond our habitual identity thinking and the world that such thinking 
has produced. It is in this sense that art speaks a truth by its ‘not saying’. It is also how the 
saying of philosophy comes up against its other: the art that doesn’t speak its language.  
 The non-propositional truth content offered by the work of art is, for Adorno, a 
political truth. The autonomy of the work of art is in itself an implicit critique of the world of 
what he calls ‘the ends-means-rationality of utility (AT, 223). Works of art are not actually 
completely free, because in the world we inhabit, they are always socially determined. But 
the paradox of a glimpse of freedom being produced by something determinate gives art its 
critical, oppositional distance from total determinism. In a later passage of Aesthetic Theory, 
Adorno describes it as a kind of fetish – concealing an absence (the absence of freedom), but 
drawing attention to that absence by the very fact of not being the free thing it claims to be:   
The truth content of artworks, which is indeed their social truth, is 
predicated on their fetish character. The principle of heteronomy, apparently 
the counterpart of fetishism, is the principle of exchange, and in it 
domination is masked. Only what does not submit to that principle acts as 
the plenipotentiary of what is free from domination; only what is useless can 
stand in for the stunted use value. Artworks are plenipotentiaries of things 
that are no longer distorted by exchange, profit, and the false needs of a 
degraded humanity. In the context of total semblance, art’s semblance of 
being-in-itself is the mask of truth. (227) 
 
This is the basis of the negative knowledge that works of art offer for Adorno; they provide 
us with a negative image of freedom. In a world of ‘heteronomy’, in which every thing is 
determined by forces outside itself and all relations are governed by these forces (the forces 
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of profit and exchange, of rational utility), art’s uselessness appears to exempt it from the 
rule. This appearance is just that – an appearance, a ‘mask of truth’, since there can be no 
absolute autonomy in this world of means-end utility. And yet, like the fetish which conceals 
an absence by substituting itself for the absent object, whilst also drawing attention to that 
absence, the mask of truth at least shows us what the truth it impersonates might look like. 
Art shows us a truth not by embodying it, but by being a placeholder for it. It negatively 
circumscribes the place of a truth which is barred to us, and is visible only as a kind of 
negation or inversion – in Adorno’s words, as ‘mirror-writing’ (1978, 247) – of what is. 
Works of art give us a negative impression of what the world would look like from the 
(impossible) viewpoint of utopia. 
 Adorno’s idea of negative knowledge, and to some extent his aesthetic theory, have  
been linked to the tradition of negative theology. Many writers make the connection in 
passing, but it has sometimes been used as the basis of a severe criticism of Adorno’s late 
work in particular as nihilist, or in Habermas’s view, as mystical, irrationalist, empty and 
incoherent.
5
 However, the comparison is actually more illuminating than such a view would 
suggest, as we shall see by turning to my second instance of not saying: the apophatic 
reasoning of Pseudo-Dionysius. 
 In negative theology, a sub-category of the Christian mystical tradition, negative, or 
apophatic reasoning is used to approach God, who is unknowable, ineffable and cannot be 
described or accounted for by human reason. This tradition thinks of God as present within 
his effects (i.e. creation), but not identical with them – he is not reducible to creation. In his 
essence, he is transcendent, beyond creation and thus beyond discursive reason which 
belongs to the created world. In the words of Pseudo-Dionysius in his Divine Names, ‘It [the 
One] is and it is as no other being is. Cause of all existence, and therefore itself transcending 
existence, it alone could give an authoritative account of what it really is.’6 God thus exceeds 
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all language, all concepts: ‘The unknowing of what is beyond being is something above and 
beyond speech, mind, or being itself’ (49). This means that it is in effect impossible to say 
anything true about God. It is equally impossible to say anything false, because God always 
exceeds anything one could say about him: he is beyond language, beyond the propositions of 
reason.  
 Pseudo-Dionysius, the father of the apophatic tradition, expresses this idea in his 
Mystical Theology, via an account of the story from Exodus 19 of Moses ascending Mount 
Sinai and experiencing a divine vision. Moses ascends and does not see God, who cannot be 
looked upon, but sees ‘the place where He was’. In these heights to which the mind can rise, 
Dionysius continues,  
He [Moses] breaks free of them, away from what sees and is seen, and he 
plunges into the truly mysterious darkness of unknowing. Here, renouncing 
all that the mind may conceive, wrapped entirely in the intangible and the 
invisible, he belongs completely to him who is beyond everything. Here, 
being neither oneself nor someone else, one is supremely united by a 
completely unknowing inactivity of all knowledge, and knows beyond the 
mind by knowing nothing. (137) 
 
Moses ‘belongs completely’ to God in the experience of a kind of jouissance in which his 
very subjectivity risks dissolution. In approaching the space where God is, he sees that 
occupying that space can come only at the cost of giving up not only knowledge, but the very 
capacity to know. James Gordon Finlayson glosses this passage helpfully: 
It would be wrong to think of this oneness with God as an experience of the 
divine presence, for in this place God remains concealed, the one who is 
hidden in the darkness. God’s presence is not revealed: his essence is not 
perceived. Nor is there anyone, any cognitive subject or knower to whom 
the divine presence could manifest itself.
7
 
 
God cannot be known by any cognitive subject, nor can his being be designated with the 
imperfect tools of human language. Yet given that Dionysius the theologian is nonetheless 
writing in some sense about God, this surely does not mean he concludes that one should just 
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remain silent. Instead, in his Divine Names he proceeds to accumulate propositions about 
God, whom he refers to with the Greek pre-fix ‘hyper’, calling him (in the standard 
translation) ‘super-divine, super-essential and super-good’ to indicate that his essence lies 
beyond anything that language can define. Dionysius is moved to say all sorts of things about 
God – that he is, or is called ‘sun, star, fire, water, wind and dew, cloud, archetypal stone, and 
rock, that he is all, that he is no thing’ (56). He even states,  
I have spoken of the images we have of him, of the forms, figures and 
instruments proper to him, of the places in which he lives and of the 
ornaments he wears. I have spoken of his anger, grief, and rage, of how he is 
said to be drunk and hungover, of his oaths and curses of his sleeping and 
waking, and indeed of all those images we have of him. (139)8 
 
But these are not in any straightforward sense affirmations about God. Gordon Finlayson 
again: 
Dionysius is of the view that affirmative or cataphatic language is 
inappropriate to God’s divinity. The problem with ordinary affirmation is 
that it is determination, and the superessential being is not determinable. As 
he puts it, God ‘does not exist here and not there’; he does not ‘possess this 
kind of existence but not that.’ To say something of God is to deny 
something else of him (or her, or it): For example, to say that God is light is 
to imply that God is not darkness. Any determinate affirmation is thus 
implicitly a negation or a denial. (14. Quotations from The Divine Names) 
 
The accumulation of propositions is thus used not to describe God, but to provoke a crisis in 
language – to reveal its inadequacy as a way of approaching the divine. Language is not 
abandoned, but is brought to the edge of collapse by a superabundance of propositions. 
 In a very different context, Adorno elaborates a similar problem. For all his atheist 
materialism, he designates within his philosophical scheme a place of something beyond the  
sphere of experience, something apparently transcendent (and I will return to the problem of 
transcendence shortly) which is nowhere present within the world as it exists and which 
cannot be directly apprehended with the tools that the existing world offers. This place is 
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utopia, sometimes referred to as the place of non-identity, by which he means the place where 
we would cease to be deluded into thinking that what is is the real truth of things, that the 
world we have is the free world we could have. The object of Adorno’s thinking is political, 
but he often retains religious terms to designate this utopian point. In the moving last 
fragment of Minima Moralia he describes it as the place of redemption. It is worth quoting at 
some length: 
Finale [Zum Ende] – The only philosophy which can be responsibly 
practised in the face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as 
they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption. 
Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world by redemption: all else is 
reconstruction, mere technique. Perspectives must be fashioned that displace 
and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent 
and distorted as it will appear one day in the messianic light. To gain such 
perspectives without velleity or violence, entirely from felt contact with its 
object – this alone is the task of thought. It is the simplest of all things, 
because the situation calls imperatively for such knowledge, indeed because 
consummate negativity, once squarely faced, delineates the mirror-writing 
of its opposite. But it is also the utterly impossible thing, because it 
presupposes a standpoint removed, even though by a hair’s breadth, from 
the scope of existence, whereas we well know that any possible knowledge 
must not only be first wrested from what is, if it shall hold good, but is also 
marked, for this very reason, by the same distortion and indigence which it 
seeks to escape.
9
 
 
Like Dionysius’ God who surpasses all human attempts to know or describe him, Adorno’s 
utopia, the truth of redemption, cannot be expressed with the means belonging to the unfree 
world we have, in which we think via distorting concepts that falsely purport to give us 
access to truth. From within this world of identity thinking and rationality, we can only 
apprehend the alternative indirectly, as that which it is impossible to say, but which reveals 
that impossibility in the form of its critique. The very impossibility of saying shows us the 
limits of our means. Thus the truth can be circumscribed with propositions as a space which 
those propositions come up against but do not penetrate – like the mystical mountain top on 
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which Moses is joined to God only at the cost of giving up human understanding and knows 
him only at the price of the subjectivity that is able to know. 
 This negative or apophatic logic shows itself in Adorno’s approach to writing (of 
which the paradox of the opening quotation is a good example). He rejects systematic 
philosophical thinking in favour of a rhetoric of negation, chiasmus and what, drawing on 
Walter Benjamin, he calls the ‘constellation’, a punctual affirmation in relation to an object 
that is always subject to reconfiguration, re-framing, re-formulation. But this same logic also 
shows itself in the very structure of the work of art as he conceives it: as a fetish or a mask of 
truth. For him, this is the inherent, negative critical power of the work of art, as interpreted by 
philosophy: ‘What art actually is, is contradiction, rejection, negation. Determinations of this 
kind are basic to Adorno’s aesthetics.’10  But Adorno, the great admirer of Schoenberg, Kafka 
and Beckett observes that with modernism, art becomes more and more consciously 
preoccupied with negation: ‘Art seeks refuge in its own negation, hoping to survive through 
its death’ (AT, 338). Negativity, loss or absence (including the absence of an idea of art) 
becomes central to art’s subject-matter,11 raising a crucial question. Does this development 
(which for Adorno is an inevitable product of late capitalism) change art’s capacity to 
embody some kind of truth? This question brings me to my fourth instance (I shall return 
shortly to the third instance of ‘not saying’): the case of not thinking, or rather of thinking 
about nothing, and a good example of an art consumed by negativity.  
 In the second chapter of the Mystical Theology, Pseudo-Dionysus uses a striking 
analogy: 
If only we lacked sight and knowledge so as to see, so as to know, unseeing 
and unknowing, that which lies beyond all vision and knowledge. For this 
would be really to see and to know: to praise the Transcendent One in a 
transcending way, namely through the denial of all beings. We would be 
like sculptors who set out to carve a statue. They remove every obstacle to 
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the pure view of the hidden image, and simply by this act of clearing aside 
they show up the beauty which is hidden. (138) 
 
This is a familiar way of thinking about sculpture (in its manifestation as carving at least): the 
sculptor removes superfluous material in order to reveal a form that somehow inheres as 
potential in the formless matter.
12
 As commentators have observed, it is quite a poor analogy 
for describing Dionysius’ negative theological method, but it is nonetheless a suggestive one, 
not least because the Greek word Dionysius uses – aphairesis, here translated as ‘clearing 
away’ – is translated elsewhere as ‘denial’. Form is revealed in an act of negation or denial of 
that which is not it, but which accumulates around it and thus defines it negatively.   
 London Field Works’s Null Object: Gustav Metzger thinks about nothing actualizes 
some of the potential of this image in a compellingly literal – and negative – way. Created in 
2011, the end product of this work is a sculpture made from a 50cm cube of Portland Roach 
stone (Fig.1). Gilchrist and Joelson’s collaboration with Gustav Metzger (1926-2017) is 
significant here. Metzger, an artist of Polish-Jewish extraction, born and raised in Nuremberg, 
arrived in Britain from Germany on a Kindertransport in 1939. In 1959 he published the 
Manifesto of Auto-destructive Art, and in his own artistic practice destruction and negation  
played a central role. He was motivated by a strong political critique of consumption, 
industrialised violence and the technological domination of nature. In 1961, on the south 
bank of the river Thames, he performed a ‘Public Demonstration of Auto-Destructive Art’, 
which involved painting a large glass-backed screen of nylon fabric with hydrochloric acid so 
that it partially dissolved, revealing Metzger himself and the view of St Paul’s cathedral 
behind him.
13
 Metzger’s self-conscious negation of the work of art, his refusal to produce 
anything during his three year ‘art strike’ from 1977-1980 might be seen from Adorno’s point 
of view as the logical end-point of a process in which modern art is progressively taken over 
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by the negativity which is its only response to the increasingly unfree and reified world out of 
which it is produced. And yet something we call art does go on being made. 
 For Null Object, Metzger was wired up to an electro-encephalograph or EEG machine 
and invited to think about nothing for about twenty minutes. The brainwaves produced in 
response to this impossible task were processed through Gilchrist and Joelson’s ‘Perception 
Depositary’, a database of participants’ creative thoughts produced over several years of their 
own technologically-focused practice.
14
 The information was then converted into coded 
instructions that programmed a robotic drill to excavate the inside of the block of stone (Figs. 
2-4). The resultant void inside the block is thus in some sense a negative representation of 
Metzger’s thoughts, and more specifically of his attempt to think a void.  
 This is in a way an enactment of the process described by Pseudo-Dionysius: the 
clearing away or denial of matter that makes form manifest. But it is complicated in several 
respects. First of all, unlike the model of carving as revealing, Null Object does not suggest a 
latent ‘true’ form being revealed in the material. Indeed, it might even suggest the failure of 
such an idea. The form that results from the artists’ work in this instance is not only hidden 
and largely inaccessible; it is also subjectively derived in a manner that is at the very least 
ironic, if not arbitrary, being the product of Metzger’s thinking translated via an algorithm. 
Here again the work displays an ironic literalisation of an age-old commonplace of art theory: 
the Idea. There is a long tradition in which the role of the artist is seen as being to shape 
matter according to an idea, understood as both an image and an ideal.
15
 The artist transforms 
base matter by processing it through his or her unique imagination, investing it with a non-
material, ideational – and ultimately aesthetic – dimension. In Null Object that notion of Idea 
is retained, but biologised as brain-waves, mediated by technology, hollowed out by paradox 
and reduced to an idea of itself. Moreover, the form that results from the process is present 
only in reverse – in its absence, as a lack.  
 11 
 
  Null Object is apophatic in its approach to thinking about nothing, recognising that 
this is an undertaking doomed to failure. Thoughts can be inscribed around a void, as those of 
Dionysius are around the idea of God. They thus constitute a place for it without being able to 
occupy that place. In Null Object, the form of ‘nothing’ is produced by its own negation; the 
impossible injuction to think about nothing results a gap, a void. In this context the choice of 
stone is also important. The Portland roach already contains innumerable small voids or 
‘ooliths’, created by fossilised shells which were concreted in the limestone and then washed 
away over millions of years by percolating rain (Fig.5). These voids are telling, as they bring 
with them a way of seeing such indexical traces or second-order images. Fossils, or in this 
case the spaces left by them, are generally understood unproblematically as natural signs, not 
reliant on any code or logic other than that of contiguity or co-presence. To that extent they 
are treated as evidence of a presence, of a truth: ancient creatures were here and have left 
their trace. By contrasting the constructed void with the apparently natural ones created by 
the fossilised shells, Null Object asks what might constitute ‘evidence’ of thought. To this 
question, the work responds evasively at best. 
 So, where have these two ‘not sayings’ and a ‘thinking about nothing’ taken us so far? 
We find in each of them an analogous structure of something defined by a clearing away, a 
negation or a denial. It is something (God, the good life, non-linguistic thought) that cannot 
be accessed directly, but only known or circumscribed negatively as an absence that has left 
its trace. Pseudo-Dionysius uses the image of a seal and its impressions to describe the 
relationship between the unified, indivisible Godhead and his manifestations (62-63). Like 
the later theologian Bonaventure’s idea of the vestige, a term whose original meaning was 
‘footprint’, the figure of the seal conveys this sense of a lost presence which can be intuited 
from a negative image it has left in the world from which it is absent.
16
 According to Derrida 
this image of the seal ‘figures the figuration of the unfigurable itself.’ (HTAS, 50) 
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 But these ‘not sayings’ and ‘not thinkings’ belong to very different frames of 
reference, and we must account for these, not least in considering what is being figured 
negatively, where it is and whether we can ever hope to access it. On the one hand, we have 
Pseudo-Dionysius’ vision of Moses (or the mystic) being subsumed into the ‘cloud of 
unknowing’ in which he is united with the divine. On the other we are faced with Adorno’s 
very limited faith in the advent of the good life or the non-identical which we negatively and 
partially intuit in the experience of art. And yet some other illuminating distinctions emerge, 
as I shall aim to show in the remainder of this discussion, which finally takes me to the last 
instance of ‘not saying’: that of Derrida.  
 In ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’, Derrida reflects on the relationship of his own 
thought to negative theology and notably to the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius, having first 
made reference to the tradition as early as 1964 in ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on 
the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’.17 When he presented on ‘Différance’ to the Société 
française de philosophie in 1968, a listener objected that différance ‘is the God of negative 
theology’, to which Derrida responded, notoriously, ‘It is and it is not. It is above all not.’18  
It is to this incident that he implicitly refers at the beginning of his first substantial and direct 
engagement with negative theology in ‘How to Avoid Speaking’, noting, ‘very early on I was 
accused of – rather than congratulated for – trotting out the procedures of negative theology 
in a landscape everyone thinks they know well’ (4, translation modified).19 He goes on to 
rehearse several objections to negative theology that had been used by critics of his own 
work, who connected the two in unflattering terms. The most interesting of these criticisms, 
he argues, is the charge that, far from tending towards atheism as some have suggested, 
negative theology not only requires a God position for itself, but ‘perhaps leads us to consider 
the becoming-theological of all discourse’: 
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From the moment a proposition takes a negative form, the negativity that 
manifests itself need only be pushed to the limit, and it at least resembles an 
apophatic theology. Every time I say: X is neither this or that, neither the 
contrary of this nor of that, neither the simple neutralization of this nor of 
that with which it has nothing in common, being absolutely heterogeneous 
to or incommensurable with them, I would start to speak of God, under this 
name or another. God’s name would then be the hyperbolic effect of that 
negativity or all negativity that is consistent in its discourse. (HTAS, 6) 
 
Derrida’s claim is that all negation in fact posits a ‘hyperessentialised’ being, a term he draws 
from Pseudo-Dionysius. Derrida’s previous reluctance to acknowledge any affiliation with 
negative theology stems from his awareness of the threat this positing represents – a threat 
that would imperil the very principles of his endeavour: 
I thought I had to forbid myself to write in the register of ‘negative 
theology,’ because I was aware of this movement toward hyperessentiality, 
beyond Being. What différance, the trace, and so on ‘mean’ – which hence 
does not mean anything – is ‘before’ the concept, the name, the word, 
‘something’ that would be nothing, that no longer arises from Being, from 
presence or from the presence of the present, nor even from absence, and 
even less from some hyperessentiality. Yet the onto-theological 
reappropriation always remains possible […]. (HTAS, 9) 
 
Différance, for Derrida, is not the negation of what is – not a binary structure of difference as 
opposition. It does not operate via the opposition between a concept and that which the 
concept excludes, but rather troubles the ground on which all concepts are built. It is in this 
sense that it is ‘before’ the concept, the name, the word. Yet, as he points out, it is always 
subject to being reappropriated as a distinction between being and non-being – the threat of 
the ‘onto-theological’. 
 Derrida’s response to this threat of ‘onto-theological reappropriation’ could equally be 
a defence of Adorno’s critical practice. He continues: 
One can always say: hyperessentiality is precisely that, a supreme Being 
who remains incommensurate to the being of all that is, which is nothing, 
neither present nor absent, and so on. If the movement of this 
reappropriation appears in fact irrepressible, its ultimate failure is no less 
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necessary. But I concede that this question remains at the heart of a thinking 
of différance or of the writing of writing. It remains a question, and this is 
why I return to it again. (HTAS, 9) 
 
The necessary failure evoked here is what is needed for Derrida’s own project of 
deconstruction to succeed: the staving off of the moment at which difference fixes itself as a 
distinction between being and non-being. That fixing, he argues, would be nothing other than 
the assertion of a supreme Being, a God position, the triumph of onto-theology. And it is the 
process of critical engagement, ‘the writing of writing’ that keeps différance moving, holding 
off fixity by continually ‘returning to the question’. 
 However, Derrida’s attention to Pseudo-Dionysius in making this argument is focused 
on the idea of the apophatic, the theology that proceeds by denial or negation. A different 
reading of Dionysius’ apophatism is produced by the theologian Denys Turner.20 Turner 
observes that in fact, Pseudo-Dionysius does not privilege negative accounts of God, or 
negative propositions in general. Nor does he favour silence. On the contrary, as we have 
seen, he deploys cataphatic reasoning – the accumulation of an excess of propositions – to 
collapse the distinction between the two: 
Negative language about God is no more apophatic in itself than is 
affirmative language. The apophatic is the linguistic strategy of somehow 
showing by means of language that which lies beyond language. It is not 
done, and it cannot be done, by means of negative utterances alone which 
are no less bits of ordinarily intelligible human discourse than are 
affirmations. Our negations, therefore, fail of God as much as do our 
affirmations.
21
    
 
Pseudo-Dionysius proceeds not by saying nothing about God, or by saying he is ‘not this’ or 
‘not that’. Instead he tries to say everything about God, offering a profusion of propositions 
and images so contradictory and all-encompassing that it collapses all meaning. The 
cataphatic strategy thus becomes the means of breaking apart language itself:  
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No partial, restricted vocabulary is adequate to express the inadequacy of 
theological language; only language under the requirement to say everything 
possible can do this. It is in the profusion of our affirmations that we 
encounter the limits of language and then break through them into the dark 
silence of the transcendent. (32) 
 
For Turner, one must thus distinguish in negative theology between ‘the strategy of negative 
propositions and the strategy of negating the propositional’ (35, Turner’s emphasis). It is true 
that for Pseudo-Dionysius, the goal of this cataphatic provocation of a linguistic crisis is to 
get beyond language into that ‘dark silence of the transcendent’: ‘Good theology, Denys 
thinks […] leads to that silence which is found only on the other side of a general linguistic 
embarrassment’ (23). But this is not done, as Derrida seems to imply, by negation, but by 
something that looks a lot more like deconstruction than he acknowledges.  
 Turner notes the centrality of metaphor in the Divine Names of Pseudo-Dionysius. 
The affirmations he accumulates about God are not to be understood literally, says Turner, 
but as metaphors; Dionysius implicitly recognises this, even if he does not express it in those 
terms.
22
 The distinction is indeed essential to how his apophatism is to be understood. 
Negative metaphors can negate affirmative metaphors, since ‘what one affirms the other 
denies’. To this extent they work in the same way as negative and affirmative literal 
utterances. But beyond that similarity there is also an essential difference: 
The logic of negation in respect of metaphors is beyond that different from 
that of literal utterances […] in that opposed metaphors, unlike literal 
contradictions, can be simultaneously affirmed, in so far as to do so is to 
capture, by virtue of their conjunction, the failure of both to convey the 
reality of what is metaphorised. (38) 
 
As metaphors, Dionysius’ manifold propositions about God are simultaneously opposed to 
one another and affirmed. They do not cancel out their opposites, as literal utterances would, 
but sit alongside each other, each exposing the limits of the other as a means of designating 
that which cannot be designated: 
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The negations of the ‘perceptual’ names of God do not, therefore consist in 
the replacement of one set of literal affirmations with their ‘Aristotelian’ 
negations, nor do they consist in the substitution of negative images for 
affirmative. They consist in the negations of the negations between 
metaphors, so as to transcend the domain of the metaphorical discourse 
itself, of both affirmative and negative, in the sense in which to negate is not 
to deny the truths which that discourse is capable of conveying, but is to 
denote their limitation. (38-39) 
 
Understood in this way as a logic of metaphor and not of literal affirmation, Dionysius’ 
apophatism looks much less ‘theological’ in the sense Derrida means it. If there is indeed an 
‘onto-theological affirmation’ (Dionysius is after all a devout believer in the divine origin of 
all things), this is not operating via the kind of negative logic Derrida resists in his account of 
it. Rather it proceeds by accumulating an excess, a potentially infinite accretion in which 
language is made to differ less from its absent, transcendent, referent than from itself.  
 Of course one might still agree with Derrida that the binary logic of negation tends 
towards the onto-theological. He engages with negative theology precisely in order to 
demonstrate that différance is not negation, and that negative theology ‘belongs, without 
fulfilling it, to the space of the philosophical or ontotheological promise that it seems to break 
[renier].’23  Even the cataphatic process described here can be said to assert Being before or 
beyond language in a way that Derrida finds problematic. Dionysius’ God is after all ‘Cause 
of all beings’ (136). But what would this objection mean for structures of negative knowledge 
more broadly? Are the negative structures of Adorno and Null Object stuck in a binary logic 
of negation or apophasis that asserts a transcendent origin and thus tends towards the onto-
theological too? Do they fix negation as hyperessentialism where Derrida’s essay moves on 
from that logic towards other ways of thinking about it?
24
 These are certainly terms in which 
Adorno’s thinking could be condemned as a version of negative theology. The persistent 
criticism of his politics of the non-identical is that it needs a transcendent (or hyperessential) 
position: a God position. In order to counter such accusations I return to my first account of 
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these negations; that is as ways of figuring the relation between language (or discursive 
reason) and the non-propositional truth content present within aesthetic experience. Two 
observations then emerge. 
 As it manifests itself in Adorno’s own work at least, the relationship of what he calls 
‘philosophy’ to the aesthetic object, which is in fact aesthetic experience, is much closer to 
cataphasis than to apophasis. The accumulation of propositions creates a limit, a place where 
the discourse comes up against the absence of its object – against art’s ‘not saying’. Adorno 
continually reapplies his language to that place, accumulating new metaphors which displace 
without replacing the old, shifting the ground from which his critique speaks, multiplying the 
angles of approach in order to map the surface of that absence.
25
 His language is negative, but 
it does not negate its object (in the sense of the Derridean binary) so much as it negates or 
continually modifies itself. To this extent he is close to the more complex version of the 
apophatic offered by Dionysius. As Turner explains,  
The apophatic in theology is simply the product of a properly understood 
cataphaticism [in that] we reach the point at which the apophatic begins by 
the means of the comprehensiveness of our affirmations, whose combined 
and mutually cancelling forces crack open the surface of language; and that 
it is through the fissures in our discourse that the darkness of the apophatic 
is glimpsed. (33) 
 
Null Object could be said to be binary, in that it figures absence by presence, like a three-
dimensional multi-stable image. Speaking about it, on the other hand, is not. In its shiftless 
inability to become identical with its object, critical language as understood by Adorno also 
avoids the hyperessentialisation which is negation’s risk according to Derrida. ‘Philosophy’, 
or critique here is not a master discourse; it produced by aesthetic experience which is 
irreducible to it. As J.M. Bernstein puts it, ‘the complex process of aesthetic negation 
inscribes the area where critical attention can still find a place for itself. The resultant claim is 
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the enigma of the work, its incompehensibility or silence, which calls forth philosophical 
reflection while remaining beyond discursive redemption.’26 
 But there is another risk here; that of falling back on a crude distinction between, on 
the one hand, a visual metaphor of negation and on the other, the power of metaphor proper, 
which has no negative pole. In order to avoid this risk we need to acknowledge another 
particular property of the aesthetic object itself, and to take seriously its capacity to ‘speak’ as 
well as being spoken for. Null Object, like all works of art according to Adorno, is just as 
cracked as the surface of language that rubs up against it. A gap opens up not only in between 
the object and the critical discourse that cannot appropriate or account for it, but within the 
object itself, which is double in another sense. Like much minimalist art, Null Object’s blank 
geometric block oscillates between brute facticity and the transcendence of that facticity in 
favour of the aesthetic. It is both a banal object, asserted as such, and a challenge to our 
capacity to experience such a thing aesthetically. What is more, its form becomes an allegory 
for (or perhaps even a parody of) a kind of hermeneutics of depth. The fact that the 
impenetrable block has been penetrated, carved on the inside, tempts us to read meaning in its 
depths. But not only do those depths contain literally, nothing; it is a nothing (not) 
representing nothing – given form by Gustav Metzger’s non-thought. Yet it is this secondness 
of the object, its capacity to be and to represent, that breaks it apart. Between the object’s 
apophatic rhetoric of negation and our experience of it as aesthetic is what Adorno terms the 
‘fracturedness’ of works of art, which is their ‘enigma’: ‘If transcendence were present in 
them, they would be mysteries, not enigmas; they are enigmas because, through their 
fracturedness, they deny what they would actually like to be.’ (AT, 126) This seems to be the 
lesson of Adorno’s account of aesthetic negation. Modern art may thematise its own 
fracturedness,
27
 but that fracturedness is fundamental to its being. If philosophy can only 
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partially speak for the work of art, this is not just because the work cannot speak for itself. It 
is also because, in its fracturedness, it can never speak from a single place.  
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